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Abstract
Here, we summarise the unresolved debate about p value and its dichotomisation. We present the statement of
the American Statistical Association against the misuse of statistical significance as well as the proposals to abandon
the use of p value and to reduce the significance threshold from 0.05 to 0.005. We highlight reasons for a
conservative approach, as clinical research needs dichotomic answers to guide decision-making, in particular in the
case of diagnostic imaging and interventional radiology. With a reduced p value threshold, the cost of research
could increase while spontaneous research could be reduced. Secondary evidence from systematic reviews/meta-
analyses, data sharing, and cost-effective analyses are better ways to mitigate the false discovery rate and lack of
reproducibility associated with the use of the 0.05 threshold. Importantly, when reporting p values, authors should
always provide the actual value, not only statements of “p < 0.05” or “p ≥ 0.05”, because p values give a measure of
the degree of data compatibility with the null hypothesis. Notably, radiomics and big data, fuelled by the
application of artificial intelligence, involve hundreds/thousands of tested features similarly to other “omics” such as
genomics, where a reduction in the significance threshold, based on well-known corrections for multiple testing,
has been already adopted.
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Key points
 The p value reflects the degree of data compatibility
with the null hypothesis.
 Some recommend abandoning p value, others
lowering the significance threshold to 0.005.
 A 0.005 threshold could increase sample sizes and
costs as well as depress spontaneous research.
 Authors should provide actual p values, not just
“p < 0.05” or “p ≥ 0.05”.
 Threshold adjustments are needed for artificial
intelligence-fuelled radiomics and big data.
Background
A hot debate is long going on in major journals
about p value and statistical significance. On the one
side, those who “rise up against statistical signifi-
cance”, as did Amrhein et al. in Nature [1]; on the
other side, those who recommend “do not abandon sig-
nificance”, as did Ioannidis in JAMA [2]. These are two
opposite viewpoints around a long-standing topic: the
misuse of p value and the claim of statistical significance
or non-significance.
The p value is probably the most ubiquitous and, at the
same time, misunderstood index in all of biomedical re-
search. Hundreds of articles were published on this topic
since at least the 1940s [3], with proposals of alternatives to
the classic p value with its historical 0.05 threshold. One of
these proposals, which has gained some attention, came in
2018 from Benjamin et al. [4], who suggested to lower the
threshold for statistical significance from 0.05 to 0.005.
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However, despite this debate, clinical researchers still make
large use of the classic 0.05 threshold.
In this article, we discuss the value of p value and
explain why it should not be abandoned nor should the
conventional threshold of 0.05 be modified. In addition,
we show how artificial intelligence applications to radio-
mics and big data, involving hundreds/thousands of
tested features, prompt reductions in the significance
threshold, based on well-known corrections for multiple
testing.
Opposite opinions on the p value
In 2016, the American Statistical Association (ASA)
released a statement warning against the misuse of
statistical significance and p values [5]. A special issue
in The American Statistician [5] presented 37 papers
on “Statistical inference in the 21st century: a world
beyond p < 0.05”.
The main ASA points are highlighted in the form of
do nots, as follows:
 Do not base your conclusions solely on whether an
association or effect was found to be statistically
significant (i.e., the p value passed some arbitrary
threshold such as p < 0.05);
 Do not believe that an association or effect exists
just because it was statistically significant;
 Do not believe that an association or effect is absent
just because it was not statistically significant;
 Do not believe that your p value gives the
probability that chance alone produced the observed
association or effect or the probability that your test
hypothesis is true;
 Do not conclude anything about scientific or
practical importance based on statistical significance
(or lack thereof).
According to Wasserstein et al. [6], the statement statis-
tically significant has today become meaningless. In 1885,
Edgeworth’s original intention for statistical significance
was simply to have a tool to indicate when a result war-
rants further scrutiny; statistical significance was never
meant to imply scientific importance, but that idea has
been irretrievably lost [7]. Yet a century later, the confu-
sion persists. Such doubts can lead to radical choices, such
as the one taken by the Editors of Basic and Applied So-
cial Psychology, who decided to ban p values in 2015 [8].
Wasserstein et al. [6] also say that “no p value can re-
veal the plausibility, presence, truth, or importance of an
association or effect”. Therefore, a label of statistical sig-
nificance does not mean or imply that an association or
effect is highly probable, real, true, or important, nor
“does a label of statistical nonsignificance lead to the as-
sociation or effect being improbable, absent, false, or
unimportant”. Furthermore, this false split into worthy
and unworthy results leads to the selective reporting and
publishing of results based on their statistical signifi-
cance, the so-called publication bias. Similarly, Wasser-
stein et al. [6] also suggest to stop using confidence
intervals (CIs) as another means of dichotomisation,
based on whether a null value falls within the interval.
However, despite these considerations, the ASA does
not recommend to stop the p value calculation. The two
sides of the debate may be conciliated. Just, when p
values are used, they should be reported as continuous
quantities, not claiming significance or non-significance.
The ASA position may be summarised with the sentence
“as statistical significance is used less, statistical thinking
will be used more”.
Opposite to the ASA position is that of Ioannidis [2]
and other authors [9, 10] who exhort not to abandon
statistical significance. We agree with this viewpoint. We
acknowledge the importance of embracing uncertainty,
avoiding hyped claims, and recognising that the p value
is often poorly understood, but statistical significance, in
our opinion, has a crucial practical importance. Infer-
ences are unavoidably dichotomous, especially in medi-
cine and healthcare, both in preclinical (experimental)
and clinical research. Any intervention, such as a new
drug or imaging technique, will either be licensed or
not. As such, we do need a methodology that allows for
dichotomisation. Although the policymakers base their
decisions also on other factors (e.g., economics), scien-
tific evidence with roots into statistical significance
should help in doing so. We believe that there is a need
for inductive thinking and statistical tools to support in-
ferences. If the bar would be removed, any difference
may be claimed to reflect an important effect. In front of
results from a well-conducted study not using dichoto-
misation, policymakers would ask “So, what?”.
On the side of those favouring the use of p value and its
dichotomisation, Benjamin et al. [4] and Ioannidis [11] ra-
ther proposed to lower the significance threshold from the
conventional 0.05 to 0.005. This proposal comes essen-
tially with the aim to reduce the false discovery rate, i.e.,
the rate of claims of associations or effects that are later
not replicated. According to Ioannidis [11], “the reduction
in the p value threshold may largely do more good than
harm, despite also removing an occasional true and useful
treatment effect from the coveted significance zone”. In
our opinion, the reduction of the threshold to one tenth
of the current one has more disadvantages than advan-
tages, at least for clinical research.
The threshold for significance and its origin
The above-mentioned five points from ASA are surely
relevant. To better understand their meaning, we need to
place them into the historical context. In the theoretical
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system proposed by Ronald A. Fisher (1890–1962), the p
value had to be considered only as a rough guide of the
strength of evidence against the null hypothesis. In other
words, the meaning of p < 0.05 was merely that one
should repeat the experiment. If subsequent studies also
yielded significant p values, one could conclude that the
observed effects were unlikely to be solely the result of
chance.
For decades, 0.05 (5%, i.e., 1 of 20) has been conven-
tionally accepted as the threshold to discriminate signifi-
cant from non-significant results, inappropriately
translated into existing from not existing differences or
phenomena. This cutoff has peculiar reasons. Early in
the 1900s, statistics textbooks reported many tables with
long series of p values. Fisher shortened the tables previ-
ously published by Karl Pearson (1857–1936), not only
for reasons of editorial space but probably also for copy-
right reasons (it seems that Fisher and Pearson were not
on good terms). Some p values were selected and be-
came more important than others, as Fisher wrote for
researchers (the users) and not for expert in statistics
(the theoreticians). Fisher himself provided a selection of
probabilities which simplified the choice to help in
decision-making [12] and attributed a special status to
0.05, asserting explicitly that “the value for which p =
0.05, or 1 in 20, is 1.96 or nearly 2. It is convenient to
take this point as a limit in judging whether a deviation
ought to be considered significant or not” [13].
Research methodology in medicine is such that a com-
parison between two or more datasets (groups) is typic-
ally performed in terms of a given endpoint. Examples
include the comparison between the efficacy of a new
drug/treatment versus the established drug/treatment or
placebo in two different animal or human population
samples, or the comparison between the diagnostic ac-
curacy of different imaging techniques. For a reason or
another, a study commonly comes up with different
values for the measured endpoints in two (or more)
groups, and researchers need to ascertain if the observed
difference is actually due to random sampling or, in-
stead, reflects a real difference among the groups [14].
These comparisons are typically carried out through
one or more statistical tests. Briefly, statistical tests are
based on the following question: if there is not an exist-
ing difference between the two compared groups, what is
the probability to obtain the observed difference or a lar-
ger one that is only due to random sampling? Being the
answer to this question a probability in nature, the fam-
ous p value, it is never 1 (100%) or 0 (0%), but always
something in the middle. As such, it does not provide
the probability for the null hypothesis (i.e., that there is
not a real difference between the two groups) to be true,
but rather reflects the degree of compatibility of the data
with the null hypothesis. Thus, the decision to reject the
null hypothesis must necessarily be based on a threshold
defined a priori. In practice, the smaller the calculated p
value, the more we consider the null hypothesis to be
improbable; consequently, the smaller the p value, the
more we consider the alternative hypothesis to be prob-
able (i.e., that the groups are indeed different) [14].
The threshold: to lower or not to lower?
Ioannidis based his proposal to reduce the threshold to
0.005 on a previous article in PLoS Medicine [15] pre-
senting a theoretical framework relating the post-study
probability of a research hypothesis to be true to the
pre-study probability. The author dramatically stated
that “most published research claims are false”, thus re-
ceiving extensive attention. Goodman and Greenland
[16] have already argued that “the mathematical argu-
ment in the PLoS Medicine paper underlying the proof
of the title’s claim has a degree of circularity” and that
“the claims that the model employed in this paper con-
stitutes a proof that most published medical research
claims are false […] are unfounded”.
According to Ioannidis [11], “moving the p-value
threshold from .05 to .005 will shift about one-third of
the statistically significant results of past biomedical lit-
erature to the category of just suggestive”. We think that
such a solution makes biomedical research harder and
that, adopting this solution, an improvement in research
quality is not granted. Lowering this way the p value
threshold for significance is, at best, a palliative solution.
Especially in clinical research, future trials would need
to be larger, less feasible, and more expensive. Achieving
80% power with a threshold of 0.005, instead of 0.05,
would require a 70% larger sample size for between-
subject study designs with two-sided tests (88% for one-
sided tests) [17]. Researchers could abandon some good
ideas with the net effect of depressing spontaneous,
investigator-initiated research. Only the few treatments
with large effect sizes would gain the evidence, thanks to
the statistical power granted by medical industries. Con-
versely, treatments with a small yet clinically appreciable
effect would be hardly proven as effective. This would be
amplified in studies where the outcome of interest is
quite infrequent such as interval cancers in breast cancer
screening mammography, cardiovascular events, or can-
cer recurrence in longitudinal studies. Not to mention
rare diseases or those studies where the tested treatment
or diagnostic tool is invasive and poses ethical or organ-
isational issues.
These arguments are not new. An article signed by 54
authors [18] has provided a similar view, with a deeper
technical explanation on why the statements by Ioanni-
dis [15] and Benjamin et al. [4] are unjustified. Another
article, signed by 88 authors [17], has questioned the
idea that the significance threshold should be based on
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the amount of relative evidence indicated by Bayesian
factors1, as done by Benjamin et al. [4], whose assump-
tions were considered to be unjustified.
A major point deserving further comments is the lack
of replicability/reproducibility of study results [4].
Causes of this include multiple testing, p-hacking, publi-
cation bias, and underpowered studies. As Gregg Easter-
brook said, “Torture numbers, and they will confess to
anything” (https://todayinsci.com/E/Easterbrook_Gregg/
EasterbrookGregg-Quotations.htm). A famous example
of non-replication came in 2006, when a group of
researchers presented an algorithm using genomic
microarray data that predicted cancer patients being
responders to chemotherapy [19]. This paper drew im-
mediate attention. Two statisticians later obtained the
publicly available data and attempted to apply the algo-
rithm [20]. What they found was a very poorly con-
ducted data analyses, with errors ranging from trivial to
devastating. It was not until 2011 that the original study
was retracted from Nature Medicine.
Interestingly, the probability to replicate a study show-
ing significant results has been estimated to be only 62–
67% for a statistical power of 80%, or 69–76% for a
statistical power of 90% [21]. To note, 2/3 (i.e., 66.7%)
“is the probability Laplace derived for repeating a suc-
cessful event when the first event emerged against a
background of perfect ignorance” [21].
To better understand the impact of lowering the sig-
nificance threshold from 0.05 to 0.005, we show some
examples of articles leading to 0.005 < p < 0.05 that were
later considered as relevant evidence guiding clinical
practice.
Examples of studies leading to 0.005 < p < 0.05
From the table of evidence in support of the recommen-
dations of the 2019 ACC/AHA Guideline on the primary
prevention of Cardiovascular Disease–A Report of the
American College of Cardiology/American Heart Asso-
ciation Task Force on Clinical practice Guidelines [22],
we extracted the two following examples (overall, in this
guideline, there are dozens of original articles relying on
a 0.005 < p < 0.05). The Multi-Ethnic Study of Athero-
sclerosis [23] demonstrated, among other things, that
early menopause (below 46 years) is a moderate inde-
pendent predictor of coronary heart disease and stroke
in a diverse population of women in the USA. In
particular, the incidence of hard coronary events was
7.33/1,000/year in women with early menopause and
3.22/1,000/year in women without, for a fully adjusted
hazard ratio (HR) of 1.85 (95% CI 1.01–3.37), p = 0.045.
The fully adjusted HR for stroke was 2.03 (95% CI 1.00–
4.10), p = 0.049. Notably, the study prospectively en-
rolled 2,509 women but would have had to enrol about
4,265 women (2,509 increased by 70%; see ref [17]) had
the significance threshold lowered to 0.005, with inher-
ent higher costs and time needed to complete the study.
The Women’s Health Initiative Observational Study [24]
demonstrated that among apparently healthy subjects
aged 50–79, sitting time ≥ 10 h/day (versus ≤ 5 h/day)
was moderately associated with risk of coronary heart
disease, for an adjusted HR of 1.13 (95% CI 1.01–1.26), p
= 0.04. For stroke, the HR was 1.18 (95% CI 1.04–1.34),
p = 0.008.
From the European Society of Breast Imaging
(EUSOBI) recommendations for women’s information
on breast magnetic resonance imaging, we extracted the
following example. The High Breast Cancer Risk Italian
study [25] evaluated 501 women at high risk of breast
cancer and demonstrated that the incidence in women
with previous history of breast cancer (29/674, 4.3%,
95% CI 2.9–6.1%) was significantly higher than that in
women without (23/918, 2.5%, 95% CI 1.6–3.7%), p =
0.045. As this population is hard to collect, the study in-
volved 18 centres for more than 7 years. This would have
been not feasible at all had the significance threshold set
at 0.005.
The updated NICE guidelines on cardiac computed
tomography as the first-line test for coronary artery dis-
ease were based, among other things, on the article by
Williams et al. [26] to support recommendations. This
randomised trial on 4,146 patients showed that when
preventive therapies were implemented ≥ 50 days after
computed tomography, the rate of fatal and non-fatal
myocardial infarction was halved in the patients allo-
cated to computed tomography (HR = 0.50; p = 0.020)
[26]. Being this the result of a subgroup analysis, it could
not be found had the significance threshold set at 0.005.
These few examples clearly show the difficulties in
reaching statistical significance in clinical research. But
similar problems are faced also in preclinical research on
animal models, with specific ethical concerns [27]. In
particular, the use of animal models should be discour-
aged and kept to the minimum, a criterion that is in
contradiction with the need for a larger sample size fol-
lowing significance threshold reduction.
Beyond the p value: secondary evidence and data sharing
Regardless of the misuse of p value and lack of reproduci-
bility, too much importance is given to the p value thresh-
old rather than to biases as well as selective reporting and
non-transparency in published studies. There are many
stages from the original idea to data analysis of a study,
with the p value being the very last. Decisions that are
made prior to discuss the p value have a greater impact on
results, including design, lack of adjustment for
1See the “Alternatives to the p value” section for a short explanation of
the Bayesian school.
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confounding factors, and simple measurement errors.
Biases may force significant findings to come out, with
spurious effect sizes that are later rebutted. To a certain
degree, biases may lead to a p value lower than any thresh-
old. As acknowledged by Ioannidis [11], malicious re-
searchers would easily avoid the obstacle by defining,
perhaps a posteriori, weak surrogate endpoints. Yet, sim-
ply reducing the significance threshold probably would
not attenuate these problems.
More importantly, healthcare policymakers typically
base their decisions on secondary evidence, such as sys-
tematic reviews and meta-analyses or cost-effectiveness
analyses, which summarise the available evidence taking
into consideration the methodological quality of the ana-
lysed studies. Systematic reviews “dismiss mostly the
noise” referred to by Ioannidis [11]. Policymakers do not
usually take decisions based on a single study of few pa-
tients reaching p just below the 0.05 threshold. We
should never forget that “science is built up of facts, as a
house is with stones. But a collection of facts is no more
a science than a heap of stones is a house”, as Jules
Henri Poincaré said (https://www.brainyquote.com/
quotes/henri_poincare_164238).
As said by Steven Goodman, “there is no number gen-
erated by standard methods that tells us the probability
that a given conclusion is right or wrong”. Efforts should
be instead paid to the researchers’ training and to pol-
icies that may further improve research quality, such as
a priori registration of a trial protocol, the need for a
professional statistician for data analysis, and data shar-
ing [6]. Especially, data sharing has the potential for veri-
fication by independent authors of the results presented
in a given publication [28]. When data are shared, they
may be used by other researchers to perform alternative
or supplementary analyses. An independent analysis may
show results in support of the initial findings or could
instead reveal errors or inconsistencies in the original re-
search. Finally, data sharing could potentially lead to an
optimisation of time and costs of clinical research by
preventing the duplication of trials.
The peculiar case of radiomics
Concerns on the so-called multiple testing burden hold
in any research dealing with numerous variables and sig-
nificance thresholds must be adapted according to estab-
lished methods. For example, genome-wide association
studies (GWAS) are such that millions of statistical tests
are typically performed. Keeping the significance thresh-
old at the conventional value of 0.05 would lead to a
large number of false-positive results. For example, if 1,
000,000 tests are carried out, then 5% of them (that is,
50,000 tests) are expected to lead to p < 0.05 by chance
when the null hypothesis is actually true for all these
tests. The multiple testing burden has led to the
adoption of stringent significance thresholds in GWAS,
such as 5 × 10−8, reflecting a Bonferroni correction for
the one million independent tests performed in a GWAS
[29, 30]. Application of this threshold has increased the
robustness and reproducibility of claimed associations
[31]. However, it is important to highlight that this low-
ered threshold actually derives from the conventional
0.05 threshold after the Bonferroni correction [29, 30],
not from an arbitrary reduction. Further details can be
found in the review by Sham and Purcell [32].
The integration into clinical research of enormous
datasets as typically happens for radiomics may deter-
mine a situation not different from that of genomics.
Radiomics is defined as the extraction of a large number
of quantitative features from medical images, with the
distinct advantage of assessing tissue heterogeneity.
Radiomic features offer quantitative measurements of
tissues through three-dimensional images including tex-
ture, intensity, heterogeneity, and morphology informa-
tion allowing a comprehensive phenotype analysis.
Radiomics may involve a high number of statistical
tests, with a potential for a high false discovery rate. In a
typical radiomic study, hundreds to thousands of
features can be extracted to be correlated to different
outcomes. The number of features is often greater than
the number of analysed patients (the so-called large p,
small n problem), leading to false-positive results and
overfitting [33, 34]. For these studies, the significance
threshold should be corrected for multiple hypotheses
testing using the Bonferroni method or a false discovery
rate controlling procedure, such as the Benjamini-
Hochberg method [34]. Interestingly, searching for the
optimal threshold by keeping the false discovery rate at a
desired level (e.g., ≤ 5%) or using the Bonferroni method
both yield overly conservative values for threshold [35].
Moreover, as the optimal threshold can vary in different
datasets, the results may not be generalizable. Especially
for survival analysis, selection of an optimal threshold is
not recommended [34, 36]. Anyway, regardless of the
significance threshold, false discoveries in radiomics can
be identified by external validation on at least one large
independent dataset, an essential condition for declaring
any diagnostic or prognostic value of machine/deep
learning applications to clinical imaging [37].
Alternatives to the p value
Several alternatives to the p value have been proposed.
A comprehensive discussion is beyond this article’s aim;
further details may be found in Wasserstain et al. [6].
Briefly, proposals coming from the frequentist school go
all around a hybrid combination of p value, meaningful/
clinically important effect size, 95% CIs, and other met-
rics. On the other side, the Bayesian school offers the
use of the so-called Bayesian factors, with inherent
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strengths and weaknesses. The Bayesian school is based
on the Bayes’ theorem (also called theorem of condi-
tioned probability), for which the probability that the
result of an examination is associated with the presence
or the absence of the disease depends on the pre-
examination probability and the power of the examin-
ation. As a matter of fact, none of these methods have
really seen a widespread use in clinical research.
To this regard, a simulation study [38] has shown
some cornerstones, summarised as follows:
1. The p value-only approach to inferential statistics
for studies that are properly powered is associated
to the highest false discovery rate (63% or 47%
when 0.05 or 0.005 are used as the significance
threshold, respectively).
2. The effect size-only method falters in terms of false
discovery rate (43%) for low-power studies, or when
the effect size is comparatively small.
3. A method that combines p values with the effect
size can generate heuristic, but non-definitive
evidence.
In summary, all of the many methods compared in the
study by Goodman et al. [38] have strengths and weak-
nesses and none of them generates an automatic final
answer for a definitive inference. These methods are not
so much different to one another and often provide
similar interpretations of uncertainty [39]. However,
there are cases where these statistical methods do not
clearly align. Closer inspection of these cases likely re-
veals problems with sample size, study design, or imple-
mentation of protocols.
An interesting advancement is the so-called second-
generation p value, based on an expanded null hypoth-
esis [40]. The idea is to use a composite null hypothesis
that takes into consideration the limits of experimental
precision in outcome measurement as well as the clinical
relevance. The null interval should contain, in addition
to the precise point null hypothesis, all other points that
are practically/clinically equivalent. An example of inter-
val null hypothesis for an odds ratio (OR) may be H0
0.95 ≤ OR ≤ 1.05 instead of H0 OR = 1, as typically done
in clinical research. In other words, rejecting the null
hypothesis that two effects are identical is not helpful,
because they could still be nearly identical for all prac-
tical purposes. Indeed, this method resembles that
behind the well-known non-inferiority studies.
Educational issues and conclusions
The use of p value and its dichotomisation remains a
matter for debate. As said by Krueger and Heck [21],
“hearing that p values are terrible and that, by the way,
they are not low enough recalls the vacationer’s
complaint that The food was horrible – and the portions
were so small!”. The two complaints nullify each other.
In our opinion, the general conclusion that the p value
has no evidentiary value at all seems overstated. It is dif-
ficult to argue that there is no difference between p =
0.8 and p = 0.08. A p value lower than 0.05 does not en-
sure that the result is replicable, but simulations show
that one may be guardedly optimistic about replication.
Yet, a replication study is itself no more decisive than
the original study, but each additional study provides a
small incremental contribution to the cumulative evi-
dence. We do not recommend to abandon the p value,
nor to reduce arbitrarily the threshold for significance. A
reduced threshold would add confusion to the existing
confusion and would have negative impacts on research,
especially depressing spontaneous not industry-driven
projects.
One reason why p value persists is that it is part of the
vocabulary of research. The scientific community feels
they understand the rules and is generally not familiar
enough with alternative methodologies. This was discov-
ered by the Editor of Epidemiology, who tried to ban the
use of p value but was forced to abandon the idea after
several years [41].
All this matter highlights important educational issues
[14]. First, to reinforce the recommendation for authors to
always report real p values as continuous quantities, not
as “≥ 0.05” or “< 0.05”. In other words, any declaration of
significance or non-significance must be given with an
exact p value. Second, attention has to be paid to multiple
testing and its consequences in terms of threshold reduc-
tion, especially for the emergent application of artificial
intelligence to radiomics, following the example of gen-
omics. Last but not least, researchers and readers must al-
ways remember the following: (1) a result can be highly
statistically significant but completely clinically irrelevant,
as is when a new drug prolongs patient survival by few
weeks or a new imaging technique increases the accuracy
by a very small amount (the effect size is too small); (2) a
not significant result can be highly clinically relevant, pos-
ing doubt about the statistical power of the study, as is
when a new drug prolongs patient survival by several
months or a new imaging technique increases the accur-
acy by 20%. The lack of preliminary sample size calcula-
tion in many radiological studies shows that a lot of
educational work is needed.
Research quality cannot be improved by merely aban-
doning the concept of statistical significance or simply in-
creasing the prize for it, reducing the threshold.
Disadvantages of the current 0.05 thresholds are mitigated
by secondary evidence that commonly guides medical
decision-making. After all, if biomedical research has
reached the level where it is now, it is unlikely that most
of it was false.
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